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Adopting new technologies is essential to sustained competitiveness for many organizations. In both manufacturing and service industries, new technology can lead to product and process improvements that produce tangible market advantages-but these advantages can be elusive. Failure to adopt innovations, even those with demonstrable benefits, is commonplace (Kimberly and Evanisko, 1981; Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Henderson and Clark, 1990). Organizations have been depicted as blind to the existence or advantage of external innovations (March and Simon, 1958 ), trapped by current competencies (Levitt and March, 1988) or business models (Christensen, 1997) , paralyzed by core rigidities (Leonard-Barton, 1992), and handicapped by a lack of relevant expertise (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990 )-all leading to a failure to adopt external innovations. Further contributing to the challenge of new technology adoption, organizational routines, which characterize much of an organization's ongoing activity, reinforce the status quo (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Levitt and March, 1988) . Organizations develop routines around the use of existing technologies, giving rise to a selfreinforcing cycle of stability (Orlikowski, 2000) . Similarly, routines in task-performing groups tend to persist, even in the face of external stimuli that explicitly require a new course of action (Gersick and Hackman, 1990; McGrath, Kelly, and Machatka, 1984) . Routines are thus thought to provide a source of resistance to organizational change, and the process through which organizations and managers alter routines remains underexplained in the technology and organization literatures.
Technology researchers point to both organizational and technological features that thwart adoption of innovations. The timing of adoption decisions thus tends to vary within an industry (Rogers, 1980; Baldridge and Burnham, 1975 ). An organization's history of innovation and the sophistication of its own research activities build absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990 ) and the ability to recognize the significance of external innovations (lansiti and Clark, 1994), leading to a greater proclivity to adopt new technologies. Organizational size and resources promote adoption of new technology (Kimberly and Evanisko, 1981) , as does senior management support (Yin, 1977) . Finally, certain technologies themselves present barriers to adoption; for example, architectural innovations-those with familiar components but new configurations-are often initially misunderstood (Henderson and Clark, 1990).
Following an organization's decision to adopt a technology, users' perceptions and managers' attitudes affect their willingness to use it, which affects implementation success (Leonard-Barton and Deschamps, 1988). Successful implementation has been defined as the incorporation or routine use of a technology on an ongoing basis in an organization (Yin, 1977; Szulanski, 2000) . Many studies emphasize the need for organizations to adapt for a new technology to be effectively used (Barley, 1986; Attewell, 1992; Orlikowski, 1993 Orlikowski, , 2000 Szulanski, 2000) . Leonard-Barton (1988) described a need for mutual adaptation by both organizations and technologies. For many technologies, new knowledge must be transferred to enable use-not just technical knowledge but social knowledge about who knows what (Attewell, 1992; Moreland, 1999) . Also, technology adoption occurs in stages, presenting different hurdles to adoption over time (Szulanski, 2000) . Evidence from a range of studies thus suggests that adopting new technologies in organizations is difficult. Less attention has been paid to understanding the process through which new behaviors and organizational routines are developed when technologies are implemented, a gap this study seeks to address by examining the collective learning process that takes place among interdependent users of a new technology during implementation.
We take the perspective that when a new technology disrupts existing work routines, the adopting organization must go through a learning process, making cognitive, interpersonal, and organizational adjustments that allow new routines to become ongoing practice. In contrast to previous research that emphasizes organizational characteristics, we focus on those directly responsible for implementation-the teams that initially use, communicate beliefs about, and transfer practices related to a new technology. A qualitative study of 16 hospitals that made the decision to adopt an innovative technology for cardiac surgery is used to explore the implementation process and to propose a process model for establishing new routines.
CHANGING ORGANIZATIONAL ROUTINES FOR NEW TECHNOLOGIES
Organizational routines refer to the repeated patterns of behavior bound by rules and customs that characterize much of an organization's ongoing activity (Cyert and March, 1963; Nelson and Winter, 1982) . Gersick and Hackman (1990: 69) defined a habitual routine as "a functionally similar pattern of behavior [used] in a given stimulus situation without explicitly selecting it over alternative ways of behaving." The design of gy implementation in organizations lies a third approach that investigates the disruption and subsequent learning process in groups.
Collective Learning in Collaborative Work
Technologies that threaten to disrupt organizational routines are those with interdependent users (Attewell, 1992; Orlikowski, 1993) . Interdependence requires people to communicate and coordinate to create new routines, thereby participating in a collective learning process. This may involve learning about others' roles (Levine and Moreland, 1999) , improvising (Orlikowski and Hofman, 1997) , and making numerous small adjustments that facilitate technology implementation (Leonard-Barton and Deschamps, 1988). Research on teams suggests factors that promote coordination and learning in teams in general, including authority structures, psychological safety, and team stability. Authority structures. Authority structures can promote or inhibit collective learning in several ways. First, those in positions of authority, such as project and team leaders, may influence the technology learning process by coordinating the activities in an implementation project. Second, people are highly aware of the behavior of those in positions of authority or power (Tyler and Lind, 1992 ) and dependent on them for recognition and preferred assignments (Emerson, 1962; Depret and Fiske, 1993) . Thus, by conveying their thoughts about the implications of a new technology, those with power influence others' views, affecting how much effort is invested in implementing needed changes (Leonard-Barton and Deschamps, 1988). Similarly, if leaders hold a particular cognitive frame about a technology, this is likely to affect team members' perceptions of the meaning and implications of the project. Third, when project leaders select other participants, they can ensure an appropriate mix of skills for project execution (Hackman, 1987) . By communicating a rationale for and confidence in the special abilities of those selected, leaders may enhance participants' motivation and effort. Finally, team leaders' actions influence psychological safety (Edmondson, 1996) . Psychological safety. An organization's interpersonal climate can affect collective learning in a new technology implementation effort. Psychological safety, which describes a shared belief that well-intentioned interpersonal risks will not be punished, has been shown to foster learning behavior in work teams (Edmondson, 1999) . The activities involved in learning to use a new technology and in making the organizational changes required to support its use can pose interpersonal and career risks to individuals directly involved. For instance, technology implementation often requires experimentation, using trial and error to find solutions that work (Thomke, 1998) , and help seeking (Lee et al., 1996) blood pressure while the heart is stopped. In the second phase, a clamp is placed on the aorta to prevent blood from flowing backward into the heart while the surgeon repairs diseased components ("stitching"), and in the third, the surgeon restarts the heart, which then fills with blood, allowing the patient to be weaned from the bypass machine and the chest to be closed and stitched by the surgeon. Barley (1986) found, that this barrier would be more difficult to overcome in some hospitals than in others, but that collective learning processes, rather than a priori differences in status, would differentiate between hospitals that could overcome barriers to implementation and those that could not.
METHODS

Research Design
We used an embedded multiple case design (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1989) In almost all cases, interviewers had selected a common rating; a few discrepancies were resolved by discussion, citing data from different informants' responses to the same question. This generated a small data set with 16 cases, in which each hospital had a single rating for each question.
Data Analyses
We analyzed our data to support two aims: first, to examine the role of leader actions, psychological safety, and team stability, and, second, to describe the implementation process. After all site visits were completed, we analyzed interview data to assess our focal variables and later combed through these data to develop a model of the implementation process. Finally, we analyzed archival and clinical data to compute relative implementation success.
Interview data. A research assistant who had not participated in site visits coded the transcribed interview data, which consisted of informants' descriptions of their teams, organizations, and MICS. Using a software program for qualitative data analysis, the research assistant sorted the transcribed data into seven major categories based on core themes in the interview protocol, then developed subcategories by identifying recurring themes within each category, shown in Appendix B, and finally coded each data unit (ranging from one to several sentences) according to major and minor categories, speaker's profession, and hospital. The coded data set allowed us to compare particular features across hospitals quickly by excerpting all data in the category of interest, sorted by hospital, facilitating cross-case analyses in an otherwise unwieldy data set of 2,015 coded units. We examined variance across sites in leader actions, psychological safety, team stability, innovation history, organization resources, and management support. All of these constructs varied across hospitals, especially the first three. For each construct, we sorted hospitals into three groups (positive or high, negative or low, and neutral) based on evidence in the coded interview data. To illustrate the presence or positive version of a construct in the text and tables below, we selected quotes from hospitals with relatively higher ratings on structured questions. To illustrate the absence or negative version of a construct, we selected quotes from hospitals with lower scores on the construct.
Modeling the implementation process. We used an iterative process to develop an understanding of the implementation process and identify a recurring set of steps ( All hospitals agreed to give us this access, with patient identifiers removed from the data set.
S
Our sample ranged from hospitals that were among MISA's largest customers to hospitals that later stopped using the technology altogether. Hospitals scoring high on the measure of implementation success thus were considered successful implementers of the new technology, and those scoring low, unsuccessful.
Disrupted Routines reflecting on a site visit, and then we would retain, refine, or abandon an inference or category. For example, after hearing informants describe a team's "dry run," we searched data from all sites and discerned a reasonably consistent pattern across more successful implementers. Similarly, informants' descriptions of how and why they were selected for the team surfaced as an aspect of implementation that was highly salient for them. Many inferences made along the waysuch as how the organizational status of the adopting surgeon affected implementation outcomes-were abandoned due to insufficient support.
Archival clinical data. We obtained data documenting clinical detail on all 669 operations conducted in each hospital's first six months of using MICS. These data were provided to MISA by every hospital using the new technology; we were given the subset of this data covering the 16 sites in our sample.5 The time frame in which these data were collected typically extended several months after our site visits were complete. From each hospital, we also collected data on the annual number of cardiac surgery operations. With these and the clinical data, we calculated an implementation success index, following lansiti and Clark (1994), as the sum of the ranks of three variables: (1) the number of MICS cases conducted in the first six months at each site, (2) the percentage of heart operations conducted using MICS in the same period, and (3) whether a site was increasing, decreasing, or remaining steady in its use of MICS. The measure considered absolute volume, penetration levels, and trend, thereby giving credit to several dimensions of implementation success and not unduly penalizing small centers for carrying out fewer MICS operations. It is a measure of relative implementation success within the study's time frame, not of ultimate implementation success. We formulated this index in advance of analyzing interview data and computed the results when qualitative analyses were complete.
Analysis of relationships across variables and data sources. We examined relationships between implementation success and team and organizational factors as follows. We ranked hospitals according to the implementation success measure and classified the seven highest as successful or high implementers and the seven lowest as unsuccessful or low implementers.6 For the purpose of this classification, we ignored the two middle cases, both to reflect the location of step changes in the implementation success index and to avoid drawing an arbitrary distinction between two adjacent sites in the middle. We compared hospitals in the two groups, based on evidence of the focal variables. (Ancona, 1990) , which took place during preparation and trials and occasionally during reflection and was noticeably higher in successful implementers. Also, while the first and second steps occurred only once during each site's implementation process, the third and fourth steps were repeated-trials followed by reflection, followed by more trials-giving rise to successive iterations that form a learning cycle (e.g., Schbn, 1983; Kolb, 1984) . Moreover, the process shown in figure 2 characterizes only a subset of the sample; hospitals tended to take one of two distinct paths through the implementation process. Figure 3 depicts the alternative path, which led to failure to implement the technology.
Step 1: Enrollment. Two factors characterized the first step of the implementation journey: (1) whether people were selected for the MICS project for a reason and (2) whether they were enrolled intellectually and emotionally in the project's goals and purposes. Both were determined largely by actions of the adopting surgeon, the team leader. In some hospitals, the leader was highly cognizant of a need to engage people in a team effort, such as by explaining how critical their skills and efforts were to success. For example, at Janus Medical Center, an urban teaching hospital, the surgeon's first step was to put together a special OR team for MICS. After selecting a second surgeon who would be partic- by seniority; however, perceptions of the selection process were strikingly different. When team selection was handled deliberately, it seemed to help "unfreeze" old habits and mindsets (Lewin, 1947) . Five of the seven most successful implementers fit the pattern described above at Janus and Mountain, while five of the seven least successful implementers fit the pattern illustrated by Chelsea and Decorum. Table 2 provides evidence for differences in the process steps for the successful and unsuccessful implementers. Table 2 Evidence Characterizing Process Steps of Successful versus Unsuccessful Implementers*
Step 1: Enrollment
Step 2: Preparation
Step 3: Trials
Step 4: Reflection *Summaries of evidence (in italics) of activity in the process steps in the top-seven versus bottom-seven implementers are followed by the number of hospitals in which there was strong evidence (of either positive or negative manifestations of each process step) and then by quotations from informants. Strong evidence is characterized by repeated mention (multiple informants at a site) and provision of clear, tangible examples, such as those provided in this table.
Step 2: Preparation. MISA encouraged all teams to undertake a dry run after formal training to practice the new procedure before operating on real patients. Whether and how teams actually did this varied. As illustrated in table 2, high implementers tended to engage in a full-team dry run, in which the surgeon directed a process of walking through a simulated operation, step by step. This practice session provided an opportunity for team leaders to reinforce the "tech-nological frame" (Orlikowski, 1993) In six of the seven high implementers, we heard similar stories. In each case, nurses, perfusionists, or anesthesiologists noted that the surgeon had explicitly told the team he needed to hear from them, that their role was critical. Many also said that this is when they really understood that the surgeon and the organization were serious about the changes. The use of practice sessions illustrates the concepts of learning before doing, as a way of improving later performance (Pisano, 1996) , or learning by planning (Argote, 1999) and is similar to Senge's (1990) notion of management "practice fields," in which managers participate, in groups, in simulated experiences in which mistakes can be made and learned from without actual harm to the organization.
In contrast, other sites took minimal steps to prepare as a team prior to the first procedure. At Chelsea, nurses conducted a dry run of the procedure on their own; other members prepared by reading the manual, and the surgeon did not participate in any team practice. He explained that he did not see MICS as particularly challenging, having been experimenting with placing a balloon in the aorta since 1992, so "it was not a matter of training myself, it was a matter of training the team." This description reveals a different technological frame-held and implicitly communicated by the leaderin which MICS is seen as a plug-in technology (Orlikowski, 1993) tion but ready to go." His use of the first-person pronoun also suggests a plug-in frame. The lack of team-based practice was confirmed by a nurse: "We kind of more or less looked at the room." All seven low implementers reported a similar pattern in the preparation period.
Step 3: Trials. After learning before doing, teams shifted into learning by doing (Pisano, 1996) The culture of cardiac surgery is hierarchical, demanding, and direct. These data should not be interpreted as indicative of unreasonable behavior by a surgeon but, rather, as consistent with an industry culture that is highly functional in certain harrowing decision-making situations.
In this story we see evidence that the OR team is learning a new kind of teamwork, strikingly different from the conventional surgical procedure, with its sharply delineated tasks.
In trials, some team leaders motivated the others to endure the hardship that learning MICS entailed by focusing on benefits to patients. For example, Dr. J frequently communicated his growing confidence in the technology, and Janus team members shared a belief that patients benefited enormously from the procedure. Sophia enthused, "Every time we are going to do a [MICS] procedure I feel like I've been enlightened. I can see these patients doing so well.... It is such a rewarding experience. I am so grateful I was picked." This enthusiasm-almost evangelical praise-cannot be attributed to ease or enjoyment in doing the procedure; Janus team members complained bitterly about the hours of wearing the heavy lead apron required for protection against the fluoroscopic radiation used in MICS. Similarly, a nurse told us that it was difficult to speak up openly when she suspected that something might be wrong, such as a possible migration of the balloon clamp (also lifethreatening):
Trials at Chelsea and
I'd tell the adjunct. Or, I might whisper to the anesthesiologist, "Does it look like it migrated?" In fact I've seen that happen. It drives me crazy. They are talking about it-the adjunct is whispering to the anesthesiologist, "It looks like it moved" or "There is a leak in the ASD" or something, and I'm saying, "You've got to tell him! Why don't you tell him?" But they're not used to saying anything. They are afraid to speak out. But for this procedure you have to say stuff.
To understand this description fully, it is useful to visualize the constrained quarters of an operating room and realize that speaking up such that everyone hears you is virtually a default option. It requires effort to whisper to only one person, hoping to have the information passed along. This nurse's belief that team members "are afraid to speak out" epitomizes an absence of psychological safety. This absence was typical of sites in which the team leader did not explicitly signal a change by framing MICS as a team endeavor and encouraging others to speak up. Some surgeons were not prepared to make these kinds of changes. As a Decorum nurse explained, "(The surgeon] is a creature of habit." Another nurse described his leadership style as follows: "Dr. D is very regimented. Proper decorum in the room is his big thing." We were told in two different interviews that the surgeon was the "captain of the ship" and, in one, that "he's the chairman and that's how he runs the show." In all seven high (and only two low) implementers, trials were characterized by psychological safety and reports of profound changes in OR team communication.
Step 4: Reflection. After, between, and during trials, some teams engaged in reflective practices, including reviewing data, discussing past cases, planning next cases, and suggesting technical process changes. These practices informed subsequent trials. The reflection step was characterized by collective processing of the team experience-including fullteam debrief sessions at two sites and partial-team informal but frequent conversations at other sites-grabbing whatever time was available rather than scheduling formal meetings. In all cases, reflection involved an explicit effort to learn from past cases. This characterized five of the seven high implementers and two of seven low implementers. Although some of the other low implementers did collect data and periodically analyze them for academic reports, they were not used as feedback to inform subsequent practice.
The reflection step provides a group-level analog to Schon's (1983) notion of the reflective practitioner, who engages in an ongoing private dialogue with his or her work. Group-level reflection, however, occurs publicly or out loud (Edmondson, 1999) . Reflective teams explicitly asked themselves, through formal meeting, informal conversation, and shared review of relevant data, "What are we learning? What can we do better? What should we change?" In four sites-three successful and one not-these discussions led to process changes, including uses of the technology to carry out operations pre-viously considered impossible, changes in patient eligibility criteria, and slight modifications of the equipment. Illustrating the latter at Janus, Betty reported, " [MISA] has been great at R&D. They take our suggestions and they come through with new changes.... [For instance, they] put markers on the balloon-that makes it easier. Within nursing we've shared ideas and we keep making changes." Likewise, a perfusionist at Mountain mentioned another process change, in which the team "developed a special perfusion pack for MISA's 3/8th-inch line. We had [another medical equipment supplier] manufacture it for us." Combined with Step 3, engaging in
Step 4 created a meta-routine of learning from experience, within which the daily task routines sit. The implementation journey involved multiple iterations of Steps 3 and 4.
A team-learning process reinforced by a technological frame. These qualitative data support understanding MICS . . . the technical aspects of MICS are not much [so I I thought, this idea would change the shape of heart didn't need to practice with the teami. (Surgeon, surgery and would be the wave of the future ... and Uni-Chelsea). versity should be involved from the beginning. (Surgeon, University)
We tried to do it our own way. We used our own perfusion apparatus for perfusion activity. implementation as a four-step process that centrally involves a team learning to work together to adjust to new constraints and challenges. A pattern emerged in which more successful implementers underwent a qualitatively different process than less successful implementers. For successful implementers, the consistency of a few core attitudes and actions within each of four steps suggest a model for how implementation teams can overcome structural barriers to new technologies. In these data, illustrated in table 3, how team leaders framed the technology and communicated with the team contributed to a particular kind of learning experience. When team leaders communicated that MICS was a team project rather than a plug-in technology around which "business as usual" was expected, teams were more likely to engage in a structured learning process, including team practice sessions, experimenting with new communication behaviors, and team reflection. These activities appeared to foster commitment to establishing a new, initially difficult, routine in the organization.
DISCUSSION
Prior organizational research has emphasized the stability of routines. The innovation literature has found new technology to be an inconsistent catalyst for change. Thus, the process by which new technologies successfully change organizational routines has not been well explained. The data from this study suggest a process theory in which how a collective learning process unfolds, after the decision to adopt a new technology, determines whether or not new routines take hold. Existing routines and status relationships in the context of cardiac surgery presented powerful barriers to implementing MICS. Some hospitals in this study were able to overcome these to develop new team routines, others were not. In contrast to previous research on technology adoption, we found that organizational-level differences did not influence this outcome. A possible explanation for this is restriction of range; this research context offered an unusual degree of homogeneity across sites, and our ability to examine effects of organizational factors may be limited. Nonetheless, we also found very suggestive data that show implementation success to be an outcome of differences in the collective learning process at the team level. Although an extensive body of research has identified predictors of technology implementation, few studies have focused on understanding how managers and teams at the front lines of technology implementation can make a difference in the effectiveness of these efforts. This paper thus contributes to theory by suggesting that how teams and team leaders work together to learn and implement new routines matters greatly when new technologies require collective effort by interdependent users.
Influences of Collective Learning on Implementation Success
The role of team leaders. In every site, informants volunteered descriptions of dramatic change, or lack thereof, in which the lead surgeon's behavior was causally implicated. These descriptions consistently suggested that the leaders had to convey permission for others to speak up if they were to change their behavior in the ways that supported the new technology. Non-surgeon team members seemed reliant on surgeons to take the first step toward forging new behaviors; none reported behaviors that suggested working around or trying to influence a surgeon's behavior. In addition to encouraging speaking up, some surgeons frequently communicated the benefits of MICS for patients, helping to instill in the team a sense of meaning in the drudgery of enduring long procedures using initially cumbersome equipment. Anticipating an MICS case on the following morning thus was met by Sophia at Janus with "gratitude" and by Martha at Chelsea with thoughts of "a fresh blade" to slash her wrists rather than going through the procedure again. The technology was, of course, identical at both hospitals. The framing and social construction of the technology was vastly different. Two distinct technological frames emerged: MICS as a plug-in component and MICS as a team innovation project. These frames were held by leaders and communicated to others in subtle ways and seemed to matter greatly in how team members construed the technology and, more importantly, their role in making it work for patients and for the organization.
On the one hand, the finding that team leader behavior influences project success is not surprising. On the other hand, deeply engrained institutional structures and cultural norms in cardiac surgery do not foster the surgeon behavior we observed in many of the successful implementers. The teamwork that members of the cardiac surgery community understand well is one in which every member's job is important to the outcome, albeit some less important than others, while roles that dictate speaking patterns are sharply delineated. Consistent with Barley's (1986) findings, our data do not suggest that surgeons at successful hospitals had to yield their expertise-based authority; instead, they simply adjusted to the absence of visual and tactile data by allowing themselves to be dependent on others for verbal data. A possible psychological explanation for the differences we found in surgeon behavior across hospitals was that surgeons at unsuccessful hospitals could not separate reliance on others for data from loss of expertise-based authority. a tension in which stability enables transactive memory and thus ease of coordination, which could facilitate implementation, but at the same time, increases the identification of a special small team with the technology, which can lead others to reject it. For example, when new work-practice innovations are not diffused quickly in a system, resentment of the attention received by those selected for the effort can generate pressure from others to destroy its success (Walton, 1975) . Similarly, if an MICS team is seen as exclusive, this may threaten the technology's acceptability in the broader organization. Thus, for successful implementation over time, the core team necessarily must expand, yet excessive rotation of new members early on may diminish success. This suggests there may be a point at which the project-after gaining some momentum through a focused, stable teammay have to shift to be more inclusive if implementation is ultimately to succeed in the broader organization.
A Process for Establishing New Routines
Technology implementation provided a good context in which to investigate how organizational routines can be changed. First, routines surrounding the use of a particular technology are generally well defined and can be easily identified by informants and researchers. Second, technology-use routines have been shown to be difficult to change (Orlikowski, 2000) . Third, the implementation of a new technology creates a specific opportunity and clear starting point for investigating change in routines. Although past research has acknowledged that the decision to adopt a new technology does not guarantee its successful implementation (e.g., Leonard-Barton, 1988; Szulanski, 2000), there has been little work on how to manage the group and interpersonal process to make implementation happen.
Our analysis of new technology implementation in 16 hospitals advances ideas about organizational and group routines. Literature on routines has emphasized stability and the gradual nature of change and described mechanisms, such as selection, through which routines change naturally. In contrast, this paper proposes preliminary normative ideas about how organizations and managers can facilitate establishing new routines, especially when struggling against constraints imposed by historical precedent. Qualitative analyses revealed a four-step process for establishing new routines that both replace and coexist with existing habitual routines. In contrast to Feldman (2000) , who found that a group, meeting over many months, changed an organizational routine that took place once a year, we studied a work routine executed by interdisciplinary teams several times each day. Gersick and Hackman (1990) suggested that changing frequently executed routines would be particularly difficult, and our data are consistent with that prediction. These authors also suggested that encountering novelty would provoke new routines. We found, instead, that encountering a new technology led to new routines in some sites but not in others. By the end of data collection, a few hospitals were effectively establishing the new routine as an integral part of the organization's work activities; these hospitals had teams and team leaders that underwent a consistent implementation process that was qualitatively distinct from the process that took place at other hospitals.
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In developing a process model for how to implement new technological routines, we have emphasized the role of implementation leaders and built on the observation that technological frames shape the way technology is used (Orlikowski, 1993) . Our data shed light on the process through which such frames arise and are communicated in an organization through the efforts of implementation teams. We found that team leaders play a critical role in communicating and reinforcing a particular technological frame, which affects how others think about a new technology and the nature of the challenge it presents. This in turn may give rise to self-reinforcing processes in which use of the same technology process is alternatively seen as drudgery and pain or as opportunity and privilege.
The process model that emerged from these data is, on the one hand, mundane: (1) carefully select a team, (2) practice and communicate, (3) work to encourage communication while experimenting with new behaviors in trials, and (4) take time to reflect collectively on how trials are going so that appropriate changes can be made. This process has much in common with long-standing descriptions of the learning process (e.g., Kolb, 1984) and the quality improvement process (e.g., Hackman and Wageman, 1995). On the other hand, although individual learners have been shown to follow such iterative practices instinctively (Sch6n, 1983), teams are less likely to do so. Organizational and group factors often conspire to preclude interpersonal learning (Argyris, 1982) and team learning (Edmondson, 1999) , especially when teams are multidisciplinary (Dougherty, 1992) . Moreover, these simple practices were seen as radical in the context in which we found them. Encouraging low-status OR team members to speak up and challenge high-status surgeons went against the grain of the cultural and structural context of cardiac surgery. This context and its traditions are neither arbitrary nor irresponsibly harsh but, instead, reflect a wellestablished process that functions effectively. Surgeons have years of specialized training, are medically and legally responsible for patients' care, and conventional surgical technology allows them the highest quality, most direct access to data on a patient's well-being in the OR. The kind of top-down, one-way communication that was problematic in learning MICS can be essential to saving lives in critical moments during conventional cardiac surgery.
Our process model attempts to explain how new routines were implemented in this particular context, and it suggests steps for designing an implementation effort. A range of theories of organizational learning describe adaptive processes that occur naturally, generally not in optimal ways, such as trial and error, selection and retention, and diminishing openness to alternatives (Levitt and March, 1988) . In contrast, we propose an iterative learning cycle that must be actively managed by local leaders; in that sense, it is a teleological process model, in which the implementation team acts in ways that are purposeful and adaptive (Van de Ven, 1992). Our findings thus plant the seeds of theory that is as much normative as descriptive (Argyris, 1996) .
Limitations
Given the limitations of a case study approach, the ideas in this paper remain speculative. Future research is required to explore our process model in other implementation contexts. Features of this particular context are likely to predispose support for our theoretical emphasis on team learning. First, the technology itself required a team for its use, such that team learning was necessarily involved for mastering technical skills. Second, the homogeneity of the organizational context meant that team process was the primary source of variance across hospitals. Nonetheless, we still faced two important hurdles. We might have found that team characteristics were similarly homogenous across sites-corresponding to the homogeneity of the conventional OR-team routine-or team-level differences may have existed but not affected implementation success.
Our sample was too small for quantitative tests and too large for in-depth observational research at all sites, but the crosssectional interview design offers several strengths. The data capture a variety of issues relatively systematically across sites, with interview measures that benefited from being discussed in team meetings in which our multidisciplinary backgrounds prevented us from oversimplifying what we saw in the field. Independent coding of qualitative data was used to increase confidence in our coding schemes. Concerns about biases inherent in retrospective accounts were diminished somewhat by interviewing people in the middle of the implementation process, while MICS was still new and uncertain. Our measures did not allow the precision of a large sample survey study in measuring psychological safety and other constructs, but they did provide insight into how people viewed the team leader, the new technology, and the challenges they faced when both came together.
Lastly, given the specialized context of this study, concerns about the generalizability of our propositions must be considered. First, unlike some technologies, MICS was not being implemented in these organizations to fully replace an existing technology in accomplishing the organization's tasks. The nature of variation in cardiac patients precluded MICS ever being used exclusively. This may have increased the challenge for participants, who had to learn to shift back and forth from conventional to minimally invasive technology and yet still not fall prey to the trap of habitual, routine responses when doing the latter (Gersick and Hackman, 1990) . It also may reduce the generalizability of our findings to those situations in which new and old technologies must coexist. Second, it is not entirely clear to what extent the propositions discussed here apply outside of the cardiac surgical context. For new technologies that challenge behavioral norms and organizational routines, the models presented here may have considerable applicability. In particular, for technologies in which a multidisciplinary team is involved in implementation, team learning is likely to matter, and differences in the collective learning process are likely to affect implementation success. MICS is a technology for which mastery by one person, even the critical person, separately from a team appeared to be ineffective in ensuring organizational acceptability, as the experience at Chelsea illustrated vividly. For other technologies presenting similar challenges, such as enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems in manufacturing or interactive software tools for team and project management, collective learning processes may be a fruitful area for future research to explain differences in implementation success.
CONCLUSION
The findings in this study suggest that understanding collective learning processes contributes to knowledge about technology adoption and organizational innovation, an area of research that has been conducted almost exclusively using an organization-level lens. Our study suggests an important role for a group-level lens, with attention to how interdependent team members view a technology and the nature of the challenge it presents. How a technology is framed can make the challenge of learning compelling and exciting rather than threatening and painful. This study also calls attention to the role of team leaders rather than the role of senior management in leading change. The high status of these team leaders relative to other team members was both a blessing and a curse. It made others afraid to take risks unless explicitly encouraged to do so, but it contributed to building excitement and courage when others heard the invitation for change as a genuine one.
In an industry context in which individual heroism and skill are assumed to be the critical determinants of important outcomes, this study produced evidence that empowering a team and managing a learning process matter greatly for an organization's ability to learn in response to external innovation. The data in this study did not tell a story of greater skill, superior organizational resources, top management support, or more past experience as drivers of innovation. Instead, they suggested that face-to-face leadership and teamwork can allow organizations to adapt successfully when confronted with new technology that threatens existing routines. These findings suggest the potential to impose an additional challenge on surgeons-and other team and project leaders, who already carry the weight of many burdens. Adding to their need to be skilled individual contributors maintaining sophisticated technical expertise, they may also need to be skilled team leaders who can manage a project and create an environment in which team learning can occur. Similarly, engineers are asked to be leaders in technical firms, which increasingly rely on teams to carry out strategically important projects, including adopting external innovations and developing new technologies internally. As teams become even more widely used to promote innovation in organizations, the need for the team leadership skills and team learning processes explored in this paper may become even more acute.
